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Summary
The private health sector is experiencing a crisis of spiralling
costs, with average annual cost increases of between 13%
and 32% over the decade 1978 - 1988. This trend is partly
explained by the high utilisation rates that result from the
combination of the 'fee-for-service' system and the 'third-
party' payment structure of the sector.
Medical schemes have responded by promoting the idea of
'flexible packages', and have won the right to 'risk-rate'
prospective members. It is argued that these measures will
undermine the principle of equity in health care, and will not
solve the problems of the private sector. Instead, a more
significant restructuring of the sector is likely to emerge. This
may take the form of 'managed care' structures, along the
lines of the health maintenance organisation model from the
USA.
The principles, advantages and problems of 'managed
care' structures are described. These are shown to be poten-
tially more rational and efficient than the current structure of
the private sector. Although some resistance to 'managed
care' structures can be expected, the convergence of interests
of large employers and trade unions in containing health care
costs suggests that their emergence is a likely development.
S Atr Med J 1990; 78: 139-143.
The private health sector accounted for 43,6% of South Africa's
total health care bill of over R9 billion in 1987. Despite this
substantial share of total resources, the sector provided care
for less than 25% of the total population. l The vastly greater
per capita expenditure in the private health sector is partly a
result of better standards of care, more sophisticated methods
of diagnosis and treatment, and more luxurious facilities than
in the public sector. However, it is also explained by significant
fmancial inefficiencies and overutilisation of services in this
sector. The cost to private individuals of health care has been
increasing well above the rate of increase in private income.
For this and other reasons the private health sector is currently
confronted by a serious cost crisis.
A further factor confronting the private health sector is that
a fundamental prerequisite of a more equitable health service
for South Africa will be some redistribution of resources
between the private and the public sectors.2 The private health
sector is therefore likely to be faced with a significant reduction
of its share of total health resources compared with the
situation at present.
In this paper we cite evidence to demonstrate the spiralling
costs of private sector health care, and identify the major
factors contributing to the cost spiral. We then examine the
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solutions that important actors in the private health sector are
experimenting with, and argue that most of these are short-
term solutions with negative long-term consequences. In our
view, only significant restructuring of the private health sector
is likely to address the problems effectively. Finally, we suggest
that a significant restructuring of private sector health care is
inevitable, and that this restructuring is likely to lead to the
emergence of new 'managed care' entities on a significant
scale.
Cost escalation in the private health sector
Medical schemes in South Africa are, by law, non-profit-
making. As such, their annual income (which comes from
members' contributions) bears a fixed relationship to, and
roughly equals, their annual expenditure on health services for
their members. Furthermore, most expenditure in the private
sector flows through medical aid schemes. For these reasons,
the level of contributions to such schemes, and the rates of
change in such contributions, are useful indicators of trends in
expenditure on health services in the private sector. The
average monthly contributions of members of all medical
schemes combined increased from R20,44 in 1978 to R136,68
in 1988. Table I shows that the rate of increase has varied
between 13% and 32% per year, with an average annual
increase of 23%. Over the 11 years the contribution rate
increased ninefold, compared with a fourfold increase in the
consumer price index.
















-Report by the Registrar of Medical Schemes for the year ended December 1989.
t Central Statistical Services.
Explaining these cost trends
The health sector in general is subject to a greater degree of
cost escalation than most other economic sectors. Among the
reasons for this are the ageing of the population, which
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requires greater expenditure on health services, and the deve-
lopment and use of increasingly expensive technologies. In
South Africa these facrors have been aggravated by the in-
creases in the prices of imponed goods, such as medicines and
equipment, due to the fall in the value of the rand in the
1980s.
However, there are additional factors, specific to the current
organisation of the private health sector, that have contributed
significantly to cost inflation.
These factors derive primarily from the absence of the
conditions necessary for the free market to function normally.
An effectively functioning free market requires informed con-
sumers as well as free competition between supplie.rs. Neither
of these conditions obtains in the health sector.
As a result, the usual market interaction between prices and
the supply and demand for goods does not occur in the health
sector. One imponant consequence is the well-documented
fact that it is the providers and not the consumers of health
care wl)o make most of the imponant decisions about which
services will be supplied. This phenomenon has been termed
'supplier-induced demand'. )-5
This market distonion is compounded by the panicular
incentives that govern the behaviour of both providers and
consumers in the private health sector in South Africa. The
vast majority of providers in the private sector are paid on a
fee-for-service basis. There is extensive evidence, both local
and international, that this method of reimbursement encou-
rages practitioners to increase their supply of services, since it
is clearly in their economic interest to do SO.6
This situation is exaggerated by the fact that the vast
majority of private secror consumers belong to medical aid
schemes. In this so-called 'third-party' payment system, neither
the patient nor the provider carries the immediate cost of
service.
The incentive structure of the private health sector could
. thus hardly be worse from a cost point of view; providers are
encouraged to increase the supply of services because they are
paid on a fee-for-service basis, and because payment comes
from the medical scheme there is no incentive for providers or
their patients to attempt to contain costs.
The net result is that the rates of utilisation of goods and
services in the private health sector are significantly higher
than they would be with adequate controls and a different
incentive structure.6 This overutilisation in turn explains, to a
very significant extent, the rapidly increasing costs of private
sector health care.
The consequences
The private health sector is in danger of pricing itself out of
the market. Membership of medical aid schemes has been
static in the white population for several years, and in recent
years it has begun to fall significantly, declining from 87% in
1983 to 68,4% in 1988. Although the small present membership
among the employed black population means that there remains
the potential for expansion of membership of medical schemes,
there is likely to be a ceiling to this expansion, since member-
ship is becoming increasingly unaffordable for all but the
wealthiest workers.
In response, the medical scheme administration companies
have developed strategies designed to retain membership,
without significant structural changes in the medical scheme
system. Such strategies include the promotion of 'flexible
packages', i.e. good comprehensive care at a high price, and
limited cover at a cheaper price. These adaptive strategies are
facilitated by recent legislative changes that allow for medical
schemes to engage in 'risk-rating'. 2 Both these strategies
undermine the basic equity principle of the healthy subsidising
the sick. As a result, increasing numbers of people will be left
with inadequate health insurance coverage, because a decent
package will be extremely expensive, or even unaffordable,
especially for the elderly or those with serious illnesses.
In our opinion, therefore, tinkering with insurance
arrangements will not solve the problems of the private health
sector. In the longer term, the private sector will be forced to
seek organisational changes that will allow for the delivery of
more efficient and cheaper care. One example of these changes
is to be found in the 'managed care' structures described
below.
'Managed care' - integrated health
financing and delivery
We use the term 'managed care' to refer to forms of private
health care services that differ from the fee-for-service, 'third-
party' payment system in two respects. Firstly, payment is
fIxed in advance and prospectively reimburses the provider for
a specifIed range of services. Secondly, the functions of fInan-
cing and providing health care services are integrated within
one organisation.
The best-known organisational form of 'managed care' is
the health maintenance organisation (HMO).7-1O The HMO
competes with fee-for-service providers and other HMOs in
offering a 'health plan' at competitive rates. By joining the
'plan', a member (or an employer on behalf of its employees)
enters into a contract in terms of which the HMO will provide
a wide range of health care services in return for a monthly
contribution per member, fIxed in advance. Members are thus
restricred in their choice of providers, since they will only
receive free services from providers within their own HMO;
should they choose to go elsewhere, they will usually have to
meet additional costs themselves.
HMOs differ in the manner in which they arrange to
provide the package of services they guarantee to provide. The
'staff model' HMO employs its own doctors and other practi-
tioners, and may either operate its own hospitals or contract
with outside ones to provide inpatient care. The 'network
model' on the other hand, does not employ its own practi-
tioners, but contracts with individuals and group practices of
general practitioners and specialists to provide care to its
members. Several variations exist, but they do not differ in
principle from the forms described here.
The theory underlying the operation of HMOs is that the
integration of fmancing and provision of health care services
will remove the 'perverse incentive' operating in the fee-for-
service sector. Thus, an HMO that has contracted to provide a
range of services to each member at a predetermined and fIxed
rate will have a strong incentive to ensure that its costs per
member do not overrun its income from contributions.
In practice, this new incentive structure operates in several
ways; doctors and other providers are paid a salary, a capita-
tion fee or a reduced percentage of the fee-for-service tariff. In
addition, providers may be rewarded for meeting cost targets
in terms of investigations, rates of referral and rates of hospital
admission. A well-documented source of cost saving within
HMOs is control over hospital expenditure. Extensive use is
also made of different forms of utilisation review within the
HMO structure. An example here is the comparison of practi-
tioners with their colleagues in terms of expenditure on diffe-
rent categories of service. Other methods of cost containment
such as generic drug substitution may also be used.
Since it has significant influence over providers, either by
employing them or by contracting with them on its own terms,
this type of structure has the ability to contain costs effectively;
and since it is committed to a certain level of income in
advance, the incentive to contain costs in this way is a strong
one.
Advantages of 'managed care'
Cost effectiveness
There is strong evidence to suggest that managed care
structures will generate significant savings and thus be more'
cost-effective than current private sector care.~13 Savings can
in turn be pased on to members in the form of lower contri-
butions.
Organisational advantages
The nature of managed care also throws up important
organisational advantages. Tbe integration of financing and
delivery of services necessitates a high degree of co-ordination
and planning within the structure. This is in strong contrast to
the irrationality of fee-for-service care, in which a vast number
of independent providers operate in isolation from each other
and from those responsible for paying for their services.
Advantages in the mix of services delivered
Managed care structurs tend to emphasise ambulatory over
inpatient care. The reason for this is again the economic
incentives in operation. Practitioners have an incentive to cut
down on expensive inpatient care, and so are more likely to
undertake comprehensive ambulatory care than in the private
fee-for-service sector, where all providers in fact gain greater
financial benefits from inpatient care than they do from
ambulatory care. Comprehensive ambulatory care, in turn, is
likely to emphasise a higher level of preventive and promotive
measures than is undertaken in the fee-for-service private
sector, since the provision of preventive care no longer depends
on the 'patient's' willingness to pay.
There is also a tendency to bring providers together under
one roof. This can be in the form of large group practices, or
small health centres that may include both inpatient and
outpatient facilities and dispensaries. The advantage here is
that patients have access to a wide range of services and
treatment at the same facility.
Control and accountability
The structure of a 'managed care' scheme creates the oppor-
tunity for substantial involvement by the members in the
affairs of the scheme. One example is the nature of the
contractual relationship between the scheme and providers.
This allows the opportUnity for regular and effective com-
munication between members, the scheme administration, and
providers. In addition, the expressed needs of members can be
taken into account in the planning and provision of scheme
services. None of this is the case in the fee-for-service sector,
where the scheme administration, and scheme members, have
litrle or no influence over the activities of private practitioners.
The building blocks of a future national health
system
The inefficiency, lack of planning and co-ordination, and
maldistributive effects of the present r.rivate health sector have
been described here and elsewhere. 1 -17 Managed care struc-
tures have the potential to overcome many of these problems
and to result in more efficient, more responsive, better planned
and co-ordinated care, with a better mix between preventive
and curative care. Such structures have the potential to become
a part of the framework of a more equitable and efficient
national health system in South Africa.
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Objections to 'managed care'
Three of the important objections to 'managed care' structures
that have been raised are the restriction of choice of providers,
the potential for underservicing and inferior care, and the loss
of autonomy of medical practitioners.
Unlike regular medical aid schemes, 'managed care' struc-
tures restrict members in the choice of providers and facilities
to which they have access. Pan of the solution here is in the
maintenance of adequate quality control, and participation of
members in all aspects of the scheme. This would allow the
scheme to take action when members are dissatisfied with the
services of one or more providers. In addition, such schemes
would need to guarantee members the freedom to move
between the different providers contracted by the scheme.
Concern has also been expressed that the cost-saving can
operate to produce inferior levels of care and underservicing of
members through fewer investigations, referrals and admis-
sions. The potential for such problems is greater in the case of
profit-making structures, where the imperative is to cut costs
while keeping contributions competitively IOW. 18,19 To the
extent that quality of care in HMO settings has been objectively
measured, there is no conclusive evidence that these structures
deliver inferior standards of care.20 One should note, however,
that the litigious atmosphere that governs medical practice in
the USA may mean that the situation there is not strictly
comparable to that in South Africa.
These are challenges that need to be recognised and pre-
vented. One approach is through the extensive use of peer
review and other quality control methods, and the development
of adequate channels to allow members to communicate their
responses to the standard of care received.
Some degree of resistance from elements of the medical
profession is likely to be another important obstacle to the
emergence of 'managed care' structures. Such structures are
likely to be viewed as encroaching on professional autonomy,
and as further restricting the freedom of providers to determine
their own fee structures.
While these problems have been experienced by doctors in
some managed care structures,18 they are not an inevitable
element of such structures. Doctors can be involved in all
aspects of management, including the determination of fee
structures and clinical practice policies. In these ways, en-
croachment of autonomy can be avoided.
It is also arguable that the nature of work in these structures
can often be more rewarding than individual private practice.
This is so because of the possibility of co-operation between
different providers, and the interaction between providers and
management in the development of sound clinical and
management practices.
'Managed care' in South Africa?
We have argued that the rising costs of private sector health
care threaten to leave large numbers of individuals and families
without health insurance cover, and thus without access to
health care. We have also argued that this trend is inherent in
the current structure of the private health sector. We have
suggested elsewhere that a national health service may offer
the best long-term solution to the problems of equity, afford-
ability and rational co-ordination in the health sector as a
whole.21 Nevertheless, we believe that the emergence of various
forms of 'managed care' is inevitable, .and that only this
development offers any long-term solutions within the private
sector itself.
Some private health delivery systems in South Africa already
conform to the basic principles of 'managed care'. Examples
include the health services operated on the mines, and those
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run by some large corporations. These are all 'in-house'
schemes open only to the employees of the companies con-
cerned.
There are also indications that other large employers, as well
some of the large trade unions, are investigating and in some
cases already negotiating the development of these structures.
This reflects the perception of the 'business community', a
large purchaser of private sector health care, and that of the
organised consumers of health care, that fee-for-service,
'third-parry payment' private health care is not cost-effective,
and that significant improvements are possible.
More recently, some of the medical aid administration
companies are investigating 'managed care' optionsJ reflecting
their own perceptions of the limits to private care as currently
structured.
The private health sector in South Africa is therefore on the
brink of a period of substantial change. The traditional form of
fee-for-service care is likely to remain in place for some time,
but to provide care to a static and then diminishing proportion
of the population. At the same time, 'managed care' structures,
either in the form of extensions of the versions already in
existence or through the emergence of a variety of new
'HMO'-like structures, are likely to provide care to an increa-
sing proportion of those currently in the private health sector.
We acknowledge the assistance of our colleagues in the Centre
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expressed in this article, and Ms Jennifer Harris for assistance in
preparation of the manuscript.
REFERENCES
I. McInryre DE, Dorrington RE. Trends in the distribution of South Mrican
health care expendirure. S Afr MedJ 1990; 78: 125-129 (this issue).
Comment
The preceding article was submilled co various interested
parties for comment. The following comments were received
from Dr B. B. Mandell, Chairman of Federal Council,
Medical Association of South I1fn·ca:
The authors have conducted an in-depth study into the
present 'fee-per-service' system of providing private health
care and in doing so have pointed out its increasing inability
to cope with rising costs fuelled by patient demand and the
escalating cost of advanced technology. If a system in
operation is obviously failing, it is incumbent on those
whose responsibility it is to ensure that a health Care
system of quality at reasonable cost is available to the
population to seriously examine the fundamental reasons
for the collapse of the system in an attempt to restore it to
vigorous health if possible, but at the same time to explore
alternatives in the event that the system cannot be resusci-
tated.
In examining the reasons for the system's present inability
to cope with rising costs, necessitating subscriptions which
annually far exceed consumer price indices, it is important
to ascertain whether these problems have been occurring in
other countries where the 'fee-per-service' system has been
in existence for years. There is no doubt that they, too, are
experiencing problems and for some time now have ineffec-
tually tried to prop the system up. This has led the
countries involved to investigate other systems of primary
health care cover and in the USA spawned the HMOs of
2. De Bttr C, Broomberg J. Financing health for all - is national health
insurance the first step? S Afr MdJ 1990; 78: 144-147 (this issue).
3. Hay J, Leahy MJ. Physician induced demand: an empiricaI analysis of the
consumer information gap. J Health Econ 1982; 1: 231-244.
4. Evans RG. Supplier induced demand: some empirical evidence and obser-
vations. In: Perlman M, "d. The Ecorwmics of Hea/rh and Medical Care.
London: Macmillan, 1974.
5. Wilensky GR, Rossiter LF. The relative importance of physician induced
demand in the demand for medical care. Mt7bank Mem Fund Q 1983; 61:
252-277.
6. Broomberg J, Price M. The impaer of the fee-for-service reimbursement
system on utilisation of health services: 1. A review of the derminants of
doctors' practice panems. S Afr MedJ 1990; 78: 130-/32 (this issue).
7. Kau C. The emergence of health maintenance organisations (HMOs)
Posrgrad Med 1983; 73: 195-199.
8. Saward EW, Fleming S. Health maintenance organisations. Sri Am 1980;
243: 47-53.
9. Luft H. HMOs: Dimensions of Performance. New York: Wiley Interscience,
1981.
10. Mayer TR, Mayer GG. HMOs: origins and development. Occasional notes.
N Eng/J Med 1985; 312: 590-594.
11. Luft H. How do HMOs achieve their savings? N Engl J Med 1978; 298:
1336-1343.
12. Gaus C, Cooper B, Hirschrnan C. Contrasts in HMO and fee-for-service
performance. Soc Secur Bull 1976; 39: 3-14.
13. Manning W, Leibowits GA, Goldberg WH er al. A controlled trial of the
effect of prepaid group practice on the use of services. N Engl J Med 1984;
310: 1505-1510.
14. Price M, De Beer C. Can privatisation solve the problems in the health
sector? In: Centre for the Study of Health Policy. A Naeional Hea/ch Service
for South Africa. Part I: The Case for Change. Johannesburg: Centre for the
Study of Health Policy, 1988: 59-88.
IS. Price M. The consequences of health services privatisation for equality and
equity in health care in South Mrica. Sac Sri Med 1988; 27: 703-716.
16. Naylor CD. Privatisation of South Mrican health services: are the underlying
assumptions correct? S Afr MedJ 1987; 72: 673-678.
17. Naylor CD. Private medicine and the privatisation of health care in South
Africa. Sac Sci Med 1988; 27: 1153-1170.
18. Scovem H. Hired help: a physician's experiences in a for-profit staff model
HMO. N Eng/J Med 1988; 319: 787-790.
19.. Hillman AL. Financial incentives for physicians in HMOs: is there a conflier
of interest? N Eng/J Med 1987; 317: 1729-1731.
20. Cunningham FC, Williamson JW. How does the quality of care in HMOs
compare to that in other settings? The Group Hea/rh Jo~rnal 1980; 1: 3-22.
21. Centre for the Study of Health Policy. A National Hea/ch Service for Sourh
Africa. Pare 1: The Case for Change. Johannesburg: Centre for the Study of
Health Policy, 1988.
the 1970s. Continued problems during the 1980s caused
'managed care' (HMOs) to proliferate and flourish in that
country. Strangely enough, HMOs in one form or another
were in existence in Europe at the turn of the century.
Most failed, owing to their inability to recognise the vital
importance of the doctor/patient relationship.
The failure of the present US system to thrive is due to a
number of factors. The cost of pure health care expenditure
is rising - in the USA the problem of AIDS alone has
been estimated at 5 billion dollars in 2 - 3 years. The rising
cost is being compounded by population growth, population
deIIJ.and for more and increasingly sophisticated medical
services, and increasing longevity - the result of improving
primary and preventive health care - requiring prolonged
medical and nursing services. These demands are generated
by increasing media involvement and the rapid advance of
expensive medical technology. The desired market principles,
which should provide the foundation of the system, fail and
pure profit motives are prevalent, and thus the system is
overheating. Since the introduction of the system in 1967,
failure to deal with escalating demands through disincentives
and education, has led the medical aid funds - unable to
control doctor-generated costs of investigations, medicines,
hospitalisation and medical and surgical technology - to
restrict severely the benefits paid to members for services
rendered by doctors. The problem, compounded by the
system of guaranteed direct payment, has resulted in over-
servicing, possible tariffmanship, increased dispensing by
doctors, more surgical interventions, increased specialisation
and possibly a reduction in the quality of medical care, all
in an attempt to ensure a reasonable income for long hours
of hard work. As a result the whole system is less cost- ,
effective. In addition, it certainly does not cater for 85% of
the population, and is unlikely to do so in the foreseeable
future. This is where South Africa is so different
from Western communities. If the present system is
experiencing so many difficulties in the almost pure
atmosphere of First-World medicine, how can it possibly
survive in a country where it serves 15% (the First-World
component) and cannot possibly serve the 85% (the majority
or Third-World component).
On the other hand, despite its faults, there is good in the
system, and that good must stand in order to create quality
control alongside any other proposed system, stimulating
and promoting competitive market principles to which we
are supposed to be committed. But first there must be
some fundamental changes, such as patient education and
disincentives to control patient demand; the promotion of
self-medication and personal responsibility for one's health;
abolishment of guaranteed direct payment for investigations
and procedures; control of the cost of medicine; control of
the introduction of high-tech equipment by increased peer
review and physician parameters and, fmally, the vital
importance of restoring the doctor/patient relationship,
without the introduction of a third parry.
The system of managed care (HMOs) has been discussed
in some detail by the original authors as an inevitable
development in the private health care sector in South
Africa. The question of a national health service for the
whole country has been discussed by others in the past but
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no mention of it is made in the article. It is the opinion of
the Medical Association that such a system will not solve
the present problems but merely aggravate them. Various
models in the managed care system have been discussed
but whatever system is introduced, the doctor/patient
relationship must remain paramount. It was stated that
HMOs had failed in Europe because they did not appreciate
the importance of the doctor/patient relationship and
because of a militant, unhappy and, in some cases, a poorly
treated physician community.
In the USA, one of the major developments has been the
independent practice association phenomenon and its off-
shoots. If this successful development of the managed care
system is to prosper in South Africa, then it is important
that the Medical Association be involved in its development,
and it should develop alongside the 'fee-per-service' system.
If it is found that through good physician management
costs can be contained and the spiral of escalation can be
reduced, then 'managed care' may be what the future holds
for us.
In order to ensure that a quality system can be evolved,
the Association intends holding a seminar which will
examine all the available systems in depth. The authors of
this paper, with excellent references to call on, have accepted
that a 'managed care' system is an inevitable development
in this country. The majority of these references come from
the USA and this is why it is vital to hold a seminar in
South Africa, considering the fact that our problems are so
different from those elsewhere. The Association's involve-
ment in primary health care and preventive medicine is
vitally important, as is its involvement in medical care.
Both are interrelated and must not be ignored, as the
future health of the nation is in peril.
